



# MDROs & Diagnostic Stewardship

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
# BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS

As Antibiotic Discovery Stagnates ...  
A Public Health Crisis Brews



 **IIDSA**  
Infectious Diseases Society of America

July 2004



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## Antibiotic resistance—the need for global solutions



*Ramanan Laxminarayan, Adriano Duse, Chand Wat'hal, Anita K M Zaidi, Heiman FL Wertheim, Nithima Sumpradit, Erika Vlieghe, Gabriel Levy Hara, Ian M Gould, Herman Goossens, Christina Greka, Anthony D So, Maryam Bigdeli, Goran Tomson, Will Woodhouse, Eva Ombaka, Arturo Quizhpe Peralta, Farah Naz Qamar, Fatima Mir, Sam Kariuki, Zulfiqar A Bhutta, Anthony Coates, Richard Bergstrom, Gerard D Wright, Eric D Brown, Otto Cars*

The causes of antibiotic resistance are complex and include human behaviour at many levels of society; the consequences affect everybody in the world. Similarities with climate change are evident. Many efforts have been made to describe the many different facets of antibiotic resistance and the interventions needed to meet the challenge. However, coordinated action is largely absent, especially at the political level, both nationally and internationally. Antibiotics paved the way for unprecedented medical and societal developments, and are today indispensable in all health systems. Achievements in modern medicine, such as major surgery, organ transplantation, treatment of preterm babies, and cancer chemotherapy, which we today take for granted, would not be possible without access to effective treatment for bacterial infections. Within just a few years, we might be faced with dire setbacks, medically, socially, and economically, unless real and unprecedented global coordinated actions are immediately taken. Here, we describe the global situation of antibiotic resistance, its major causes and consequences, and identify key areas in which action is urgently needed.

### Part 1: Global epidemiology of antibiotic resistance and use

#### The rise of resistance

The decreasing effectiveness of antibiotics in treating common infections has quickened in recent years, and

Resistance has spread worldwide. Antibiotic-resistant gonorrhoea emerged in Vietnam in 1967,<sup>3</sup> then spread to the Philippines, and finally the USA.<sup>5</sup> NDM enzymes, first reported in 2008, are now found worldwide.<sup>7</sup> The distribution of resistance genes, such as Enterobacteriaceae-

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The NEW ENGLAND  
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## Antibiotic-Resistant Bugs in the 21st Century — A Clinical Super-Challenge

- It is more difficult than ever to eradicate infections caused by antibiotic-resistant “superbugs,”
- And the problem is exacerbated by a dry pipeline for new antimicrobials with bactericidal activity against gram-negative bacteria



# MDROs




# NEED TO IDENTIFY ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE?

1. PRP Meningitis
2. MRSA: Squeezing the balloon
3. VRE / LRE
4. Colistin resistant : *Klebsiella pneumoniae*; *Acinetobacter baumannii*, *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* and *E.coli*




# **Time Series Analysis of AMR at a Tertiary Care Hospital Delhi. India.**

# % Resistance - *S. aureus* - Blood Isolates - IPD



# % Vancomycin Resistance *Enterococci* spp. - Blood Isolates



Indian J Med Res 135, June 2012, pp 907-912

## A ten year analysis of multi-drug resistant blood stream infections caused by *Escherichia coli* & *Klebsiella pneumoniae* in a tertiary care hospital

Sanghamitra Datta, Chand Wattal, Neeraj Goel, Jaswinder K. Oberoi, Reena Raveendran & K.J. Prasad

*Department of Clinical Microbiology, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi, India*

Received October 11, 2010

***Background & objectives:*** Extensive use of antibiotics has added to the escalation of antibiotic resistance. This study was undertaken to evaluate the association, if any between antibiotic use and resistance in a hospital setting, and also detect the predominant mechanism of antibiotic resistance in *Escherichia coli* and *Klebsiella pneumoniae* over a period of 10 years.

## Trends of resistance: *K. pneumoniae*

<i>K.pneumoniae</i> (% resistance)	Years										P value
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Cefotaxime	75	80	94	89	81	89	98	95	95	97	0.008
Amikacin	70	70	76	90	77	77	89	76	59	45	0.17
Ciprofloxacin	64	80	64	83	82	66	81	86	64	84	0.411
Piperacillin+ Tazobactam			55	71	51	64	67	60	88	84	0.055
Carbapenems			2.4	1.7	0	0	7	3	47	52	0.039
ESBL			48	55	68	74	66	58	44	40	0.332
Amp C	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8%	—
Carbapenemase producer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	51%	—


**Klebsiella pneumoniae has moved to the next level of resistance: NDM, OXA48, Porin Loss**



## Trends of Antimicrobial Resistance *E.coli*


(% resistance)	Years										p value
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Cefotaxime	64	67	73	71	71	79	77	88	83	75	0.005
Amikacin	57	63	68	87	75	69	58	67	57	14	0.115
Ciprofloxacin	53	62	84	90	49	86	89	95	98	91	0.037
Piperacillin+ Tazobactam			53	67	47	37	30	27	10	42	0.08
Carbapenem			3	2	0	0	2	6	10	6	0.105
<b>ESBL</b>			40	45	58	60	75	78	61	61	0.05
Amp C	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8%	—
Carbapenemase producer	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15%	—

# % Resistance - Acinetobacter - Blood Isolates



# % Resistance - Pseudomonas - Blood Isolates -

## IPD






BRAZ J INFECT DIS. 2014;18(3):245–251



The Brazilian Journal of  
**INFECTIOUS DISEASES**

[www.elsevier.com/locate/bjid](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/bjid)



Original article

## **Ecology of blood stream infection and antibiotic resistance in intensive care unit at a tertiary care hospital in North India**

**Chand Wattal<sup>a,\*</sup>, Reena Raveendran<sup>a</sup>, Neeraj Goel<sup>a</sup>, Jaswinder Kaur Oberoi<sup>a</sup>,  
Brijendra Kumar Rao<sup>b</sup>**

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<sup>b</sup> Department of Critical Care Medicine and Emergency, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi 110060, India



## Colistin Sensitivity at SGRH: Blood Isolates - ICU (2018)



S. No.	Organism	Isolate No.	% Sensitive*
1	<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i>	130	83
2	<i>E.coli</i>	39	100
3	<i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i>	69	100
4	<i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i>	26	100

\* BMD confirmed isolates only



## Colistin Sensitivity at SGRH: Respiratory Isolates - ICU (2018)



S. No.	Organism	Isolates No.	% Sensitive*
1	<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i>	373	80
2	<i>E.coli</i>	76	100
3	<i>Acinetobacter baumannii</i>	326	100
4	<i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i>	206	96

\* BMD confirmed isolates

# %Sensitivity of Yeast Fungi (Blood Isolates 2017)



Species (no. of Isolates Tested)	Amphotericin B**	Flucytosine	Fluconazole	Voriconazole	Caspofungin
<i>C. tropicalis</i> (40)	100	97.5	100	100	100
<i>C. albicans</i> (33)	100	100	100	100	100
<i>C. pelliculosa</i> (33)	96.9	51.7	84.8	96.9	100
<i>C. parapsilosis</i> (32)	100	100	72	90.62	100
<i>C. haemulonii</i> (23)	0	100	0	91.3	100
<i>C. glabrata</i> (17)	100	100	52.9	94.1	100
<i>C. krusei</i> (8)	100	25	0	100	100
<i>C. lusitanae</i> (4)	100	100	100	100	100
<i>C. utilis</i> (3)	100	100	100	100	100
<i>C. rugosa</i> (3)	100	100	66.6	100	100
<i>C. guilliermondii</i> (2)	100	50	0	0	100
<i>Kodamea ohmeri</i> (2)	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Cryptococcus neoformans</i> (2)	100	100	100	100	0
<i>Trichosporon spp.</i> (4)	75	-	50	75	0

## Antifungal Susceptibility Results Interpreted as per CLSI M27S4 Document (Dec 2012)

Species (no. of Isolates Tested)	Amphotericin B**	Flucytosine	Fluconazole	Voriconazole	Caspofungin
<i>C. tropicalis</i> (40)	100	97.5	97.5	100	100
<i>C. albicans</i> (33)	100	100	93.9	100	100
<i>C. parapsilosis</i> (32)	100	100	62.5	68.75	100

Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of isolates tested

Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of isolates tested. (- = Not done).

Antifungal susceptibility results have been interpreted as per CLSI M27A3 document

\*YST-AST Cards Vitek 2 (bioMerieux, France), E Test (Rpt. isolates excluded), CLSI M-39A Vol. 22, No. 8; 2002 (global consensus guidelines).

\*\*Isolates with MIC of <1 µg/ml

83.6% yeasts isolated from blood samples were non-*C. albicans* Candida spp. in line with the trend noticed previous year (84%). Overall, *C. tropicalis* was the most common species (41 cases; 20.2%), followed by *C. albicans* (33 cases each; 15.8%), *C. parapsilosis* (32 cases; 15.3%), *C. haemulonii* (23 cases; 11.05%) and *C. glabrata* (18 cases; 8.6%). *C. pelliculosa* was the most common cause of candidaemia in neonatal consistent with the previous year. Nearly all the isolates were completely sensitive to amphotericin B, the notable exception being *C. haemulonii*.



Indian J Med Res 136, December 2012, pp 997-1003

## Non-*albicans* *Candida* species in blood stream infections in a tertiary care hospital at New Delhi, India

Jaswinder Kaur Oberoi, Chand Wattal, Neeraj Goel, Reena Raveendran, S. Datta & Kamaljeet Prasad

*Department of Clinical Microbiology & Immunology, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi, India*

Received October 18, 2010

**Background & objectives:** During recent decades, there has been a change in the epidemiology of *Candida* infections, characterized by a progressive shift from a predominance of *Candida albicans* to non-*albicans* *Candida* species. This study was undertaken to analyze the change in the epidemiology of candidaemia and antifungal use at tertiary care hospital in New Delhi, India, over a period of 10 years.

**Methods:** A retrospective review of candidaemia between 1999 and 2008 and antifungal use from 2000 to 2008 was performed at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, New Delhi. Initially (1999-2005), isolates were differentiated as *C. albicans* and non-*albicans* *Candida* species. Between 2006-2008, these were identified to the species level and antifungal susceptibility was performed.

**Results:** The occurrence of candidaemia and total antifungal use increased significantly. Candidaemia due to non-*albicans* species increased and this was correlated with an increasing use of fluconazole. There



# What is “diagnostic stewardship”?

“Coordinated guidance and interventions to improve appropriate use of microbiological diagnostics to guide therapeutic decisions. It should promote appropriate, timely diagnostic testing, including specimen collection, and pathogen identification and accurate, timely reporting of results to guide patient treatment.”



# Era of MDROs

Diagnostic Stewardship can help  
Management of difficult to treat  
infection related cases



# The main objective of microbiological diagnostic stewardship is to deliver

1. Patient management guided by timely microbiological data to deliver safer and more effective and efficient patient care; and
2. Accurate and representative AMR surveillance data to inform treatment guidelines, and AMR control strategies




# Diagnostic stewardship



1. Is an integral part of antibiotic stewardship programmes and is also essential for infection prevention and control activities
2. Timely and accurate results help clinicians to select the most appropriate antibiotics or antibiotic combinations for their patients,
3. Also helps implement the necessary precautions to reduce the risk of transmission and prevent outbreaks due to bacterial pathogens in health-care facilities.



# Relationship between individual care and surveillance data





# Diagnostic Stewardship

Two distinct components:


1. Diagnostic Pathway
2. Organisational Pathway



# The diagnostic pathway.....

1. Specimen selection and collection
2. Turn-around time
3. Storage and transport
4. pre-analytical specimen management at point-of-care
5. Laboratory processing and procedures.
6. Feedback and reporting of results

## DIAGNOSTIC PATHWAY





# Organizational Pathway



Pre-requisites are:

- Assessment of conditions for implementation at the surveillance site
- Resources and budget
- Roles and responsibilities: Team work
  - Clinical staff
  - Microbiology laboratory staff
  - Surveillance/epidemiological staff
- Communication
- Training: clinical, laboratory and surveillance staff
- Monitoring and evaluation of the diagnostic stewardship programme



# Role of Diagnostic Stewardship

In Steering AMSP



## The diagnostic stewardship need to aim at the following:

1. To assess the probability of bacterial etiology
2. Collection of the most representative sample
3. Guide the decision to order the most relevant & useful investigations
4. Optimal utilization of bio markers
5. Molecular applications matching the gold standard to **decrease turn around time**
6. Identification of the organism to the species level
7. Performance of susceptibility testing as per the internationally recommended guidelines
8. Syndromic approach towards diagnosis using **multiplex assays**



## What are the barriers: implementation of diagnostic stewardship,

1. Within the health-care system as a whole
2. At the level of the health-care facility even with sufficient laboratory capacity
  - Economic and logistic constraints
  - Lack of understanding and training.



# What is needed to achieve DS


1. Good laboratory practices
2. Affordable access to laboratories with good quality management,
3. Capacity and capability to perform timely and reliable microbiological diagnostics are essential.



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# Revolution in Work Flow and Time to Results

# Today's Microbiology



BacT/Alert VIRTUO system



24-48 hr

1 hr




+



1.5 to 2 days

24-48 hr

5-24 hr



# Vitek MS: SGRH Experience (May 2013- April 2014) Total isolates tested:12003



ER

ORGANISMS (12003)	DEFINITIVE DETECTION 11122 (92.66%)	LOW QUALITY RESULTS (881)		
		Detected on repeat testing 521(4.34%)	Not detected on repeat testing (353) (2.94%)	Misidentificat ion (8)
GNB (8105)	7575 (93.44%)	342 (4.22%)	188 (2.33%)	8*
GPC (2576)	2404 (93.32%)	117 (4.54%)	55 (2.13%)	
GPB (20)	19 (95%)	-	1 (5%)	
YEAST (1248)	1097 (87.9%)	62 (4.96%)	89 (7.13%)	
<b>FUNGUS (20)</b>	16 (80%)	-	4 (20%)	

\* *Shigella* identified as *E. coli*



# Gram Negative Bacilli: 8105



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Organism	Identified	Not Identified
<i>A.baumannii</i> (1346)	1331	15
<i>Aeromonas hydrophila</i> (6)	5	1
<i>Citrobacter freundii</i> (19)	17	2
<i>Commamonas testosteroni</i> (3)	2	1
<i>E.cloacae</i> (35)	33	2
<i>E.coli</i> (2373)	2334	39
<i>E.meningosepticum</i> (7)	6	1
<i>K.pneumoniae</i> (2390)	2312	78
<i>Morganella morganii</i> (48)	47	1
<i>Myroides spp.</i> (10)	9	1
<i>P.aeruginosa</i> (1155)	1129	26
<i>P.flouresens</i> (1)	0	1
<i>P.mirabilis</i> (211)	208	3
<i>P.putida</i> (38)	37	1
<i>Pantoea</i> (2)	0	2
<i>Salmonella typhi</i> (51)	44	7
<i>Serratia marcescens</i> (66)	64	2
<i>Steno maltophila</i> (79)	78	1
<i>Burkholderia psuedomallei</i> (3)	0	3
<i>Brucella melitensis</i> (2)	0	2
Others (260)	260	0
	7916	189

**97.6% Identified**



# Gram Positive Cocci: 2576



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ORGANISM	IDENTIFIED	NOT IDENTIFIED
<i>E.avium</i> (7)	6	1
<i>E.faecalis</i> (335)	330	5
<i>E.faecium</i> (746)	736	10
<i>S.aureus</i> (471)	463	8
<i>S.epidermidis</i> (409)	402	7
<i>S.saprophyticus</i> (6)	5	1
<i>S.warneri</i> (3)	2	1
<i>S.haemolyticus</i> (231)	229	2
<i>S.hominis</i> (150)	148	2
<i>Strept. agalactiae</i> (25)	22	3
<i>Strept. anginosus</i> (23)	21	2
<i>Strept. mitis/oralis</i> (44)	40	4
<i>Strept. ovis</i> (1)	0	1
<i>Strept. parasanguinus</i> (24)	23	1
<i>Strept. pyogenes</i> (27)	20	7
Others (74)	74	0
	2521	55

**97.8% Identified**



# Yeasts: n=1248



ORGANISM	IDENTIFIED	NOT IDENTIFIED
<i>C.albicans</i> (381)	367	14
<i>C.famata</i> (13)	9	4
<i>C.glabrata</i> (215)	213	2
<i>C.haemulonii</i> (35)	1	34
<i>C.kefyr</i> (8)	7	1
<i>C.krusei</i> (26)	24	2
<i>C.lipolytica</i> (2)	1	1
<i>C.parapsilosis</i> (72)	60	12
<i>C.pelliculosa</i> (17)	14	3
<i>C.tropicalis</i> (370)	358	12
<i>Trichosporon asahii</i> (60)	56	4
Others (49)	49	0
	1159	89

**92.8% Identified**



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Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis  
DOI 10.1007/s10096-016-2864-9



ORIGINAL ARTICLE

# **Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS) for rapid identification of micro-organisms in the routine clinical microbiology laboratory**

**C. Wattal<sup>1</sup> · J. K. Oberoi<sup>1</sup> · N. Goel<sup>1</sup> · R. Raveendran<sup>1</sup> · S. Khanna<sup>1</sup>**



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# What makes us slog

1. Isolation
2. Identification:
3. **Sensitivity**


While ensuring quality control as per CLSI/EUCAST guidelines

**Need cutting edge technologies**




# Material and Method

## Lysis Filtration Method





# Time Benefit



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**Table 5** Comparison of time to antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) for direct identification (ID) between lysis-filtration method (LFM) and standard approach (hours)

Microorganism	LFM			Standard approach			P value
	Time to ID (h)	Time to AST (h)	Time to ID & AST (h)	Time to ID (h)	Time to AST (h)	Time to ID & AST (h)	
GNB	1	10.45	11.45	18	9.78	27.8	
GPC	1	12.41	13.41	18	11.1	29.1	
Total	1	11.02	12.02	18	10.17	28.2	<0.001



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# Susceptibility Errors

Table 4 Susceptibility errors in the direct approach in comparison with other studies using lysis-filtration method (LFM)

Organism	Present study (1 %)		Machen et al. [6]; 2014 (3 %)	
	Major error (false R)	Very major error (false S)	Major error (false R)	Very major error (false S)
<i>E. coli</i>	0	1	1	0
<i>K. pneumoniae</i>	1	1	0	0
<i>Acinetobacterbaumani</i>	1	1	0	0
<i>Salmonella spp</i>	0	0	–	–
<i>Morganellamorganii</i>	0	1	0	0
<i>Proteus mirabilis</i>	2	0	0	4
<i>S. epidermidis</i>	0	0	12	5
<i>E. faecalis</i>	1	0	0	0



**Microbial  
identification and  
automated  
antibiotic  
susceptibility testing  
directly from  
positive blood  
cultures using MALDI-  
TOF  
MS and VITEK 2**

**C. Wattal & J. K. Oberoi**





# Hard Truth



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- More than 70% of clinical decisions in healthcare are based on laboratory results.
- Less than 25% of microbiology reports are used for guiding therapy.

## Reason

- Delay in reports

Cunney et al. International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 2000;14:13–19  
Fell L. et al Chair's Message, ASCP Associate Council. Lab Med. 2005;36:13



# Gaps In Diagnostics:TAT

- Need to culture the organism
  - ID & AST: 2-4 days
- Molecular tests
  - Single or multiplex
  - Batching of the samples
- Non specific presentation
  - Meningitis/Encephalitis
  - Respiratory
  - Gastrointestinal
  - sepsis
    - Varied etiology: Bacterial/tubercular/Virus/Fungal/Parasitic

**SYNDROMIC DIAGNOSIS COULD BE THE ANSWER**



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# Need for syndromic diagnosis



# FilmArray / Biofire System



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**Sample Prep**

+



**Amplification**

+



**Detection**



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# Meningitis/Encephalitis



# Biofire: Bridging the Gap

## Encephalitis / Meningitis panel, Film Array



14 pathogens

### Bacteria:

*E. coli*  
*H. influenzae*  
*L. monocytogenes*  
*N. meningitidis*  
*S. agalactiae*  
*S. pneumoniae*

### Fungi:


*Cryptococcus*  
*neoformans / gattii*

### Viruses:

Cytomegalovirus (CMV)  
Enterovirus  
Epstein-Barr virus (EBV)  
Herpes simplex type 1 (HSV-1)  
Herpes simplex type 2 (HSV-2)  
Human herpesvirus 6 (HHV-6)  
Parechovirus  
Varicella zoster virus (VZV)


*Sample : Cerebral Spinal  
Fluid*

(200µl CSF)  
Bacteria -6, Viruses- 7,  
Fungal -1





# SGRH ME Biofire Panel Data: Jun 2017 – May 2019





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Analytical SE:  
10<sup>2</sup>- 10<sup>3</sup> CFU/ml

Table 17. Limit of Detection (LoD) for FilmArray ME Panel Analytes

ME Panel Test Result	Species/Isolate Tested	LoD Concentration	Detection at LoD Concentration <sup>a</sup>
<b>BACTERIA</b>			
<i>E. coli</i> K1	<i>E. coli</i> K1, strain C5 [Bort]; type O18ac:K1:H7 ATCC 700973	1×10 <sup>3</sup> CFU/mL	20/20 100%
<i>H. influenzae</i>	<i>H. influenzae</i> , strain AMC 38-A-1 [572] type b, biotype I ATCC 10211	1×10 <sup>3</sup> CFU/mL	20/20 100%
<i>L. monocytogenes</i>	<i>L. monocytogenes</i> , strain 1071/53, type 4b ATCC 13932	1×10 <sup>3</sup> CFU/mL	20/20 100%
<i>N. meningitidis</i>	<i>N. meningitidis</i> , strain M-1574 [199/W135] ATCC 43744	100 CFU/mL (~1.80×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	19/20 95%
<i>S. agalactiae</i>	<i>S. agalactiae</i> , type strain, G19, group B ATCC 13813	1×10 <sup>3</sup> CFU/mL	20/20 100%
<i>S. pneumoniae</i>	<i>S. pneumoniae</i> , strain SV 1, serotype 1 ATCC 33400	100 cells/mL (~1.50×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	19/20 95%
<b>VIRUSES</b>			
CMV <sup>b</sup>	CMV, strain AD-169 Zeptomatrix 0810003CF	100 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL (4.30×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	20/20 100%
EV (Species A-D)	Coxsackievirus A8, species A, strain Gdula ATCC VR-1801	50 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL	20/20 100%
	Coxsackievirus A9, species B Zeptomatrix 0810017CF	5 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL	20/20 100%
	Coxsackievirus A17, species C, strain G-12 ATCC VR-1023	5 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL	20/20 100%
	EV 70, species D, strain J670/71 ATCC VR-836	50 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL	20/20 100%
HSV-1	HSV-1, strain MacIntyre Zeptomatrix 0810005CF	250 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL (1.51×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	20/20 100%
HSV-2	HSV-2, strain MS Zeptomatrix 0810006CF	50 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL (1.29×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	20/20 100%
HHV-6	HHV-6A, strain U1102 NCPV 0003121v	1×10 <sup>4</sup> copies/mL	19/20 95%
	HHV-6B, strain HST NCPV 0006111v	1×10 <sup>4</sup> copies/mL	19/20 95%
HPeV	HPeV, type 3 Zeptomatrix 0810147CF	500 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL	19/20 95%
VZV	VZV, strain Ellen Zeptomatrix 0810171CF	0.10 TCID <sub>50</sub> /mL (1.66×10 <sup>3</sup> copies/mL)	20/20 100%
<b>YEAST</b>			
<i>C. neoformans/gattii</i>	<i>C. neoformans</i> var. <i>grubii</i> , type strain, H99 [H99JP, NYSD 1649] ATCC 208821	100 CFU/mL	20/20 100%
	<i>C. gattii</i> , strain A6MR38, AFLP6C, VGIIc ATCC MYA-4877	100 CFU/mL	20/20 100%

<sup>a</sup> Detection data are from LoD confirmation testing performed on the FilmArray system.

<sup>b</sup> A dilution series of the World Health Organization (WHO) CMV International Standard (NIRS/C 09/182) was also tested on FilmArray



# Rapid Biofire GI Panel



GRIPMER

## 22 pathogens

### Bacteria:

*Campylobacter*  
*Clostridium difficile* (Toxin A/B)  
*Plesiomonas shigelloides*  
*Salmonella*  
*Vibrio*  
*Vibrio cholerae*  
*Yersinia enterocolitica*

### Diarrheagenic *E. coli* / *Shigella*


*E. coli* O157  
Enteroaggregative *E. coli* (EAEC)  
Enteropathogenic *E. coli* (EPEC)  
Enterotoxigenic *E. coli* (ETEC)  
Shiga-like toxin-producing *E. coli* (STEC)  
*Shigella*/Enteroinvasive *E. coli* (EIEC)

### Protozoa:

*Cryptosporidium*  
*Cyclospora cayentanensis*  
*Entamoeba histolytica*  
*Giardia lamblia*

### Viruses:

Adenovirus F 40/41  
Astrovirus  
Norovirus GI/GII  
Rotavirus A  
Sapovirus




**Sample : Stool resuspended in Cary Blair**

**Bacteria: 13    Protozoa: 4    Viruses: 5**



# SGRH GI Biofire Panel Data: Jun 2017 – May 2019





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# Rapid Biofire: Respiratory Panel

20 pathogens

## Viral


Adenovirus  
Coronavirus 229E  
Coronavirus HKU1  
Coronavirus OC43  
Coronavirus NL63  
Human Metapneumovirus  
Human Rhinovirus/  
Enterovirus  
Influenza A  
Influenza A/H1  
Influenza A/H1-2009  
Influenza A/H3  
Influenza B

Parainfluenza 1  
Parainfluenza 2  
Parainfluenza 3  
Parainfluenza 4  
RSV

## Bacterial

*Bordetella pertussis*  
*Chlamydophila pneumoniae*  
*Mycoplasma pneumoniae*

**Sample : Nasopharyngeal Swabs**






# SGRH Respiratory Biofire Panel Data: Jun 2017 – May 2019



**Respiratory panel: N= 1373**  
**+ve: 819 (59.7%)**  
**Organisms: 939 Coinfections: 112**



# Biofire Pneumonia Panel Ordered: Syndromic Approach

Run Information		Run Date	
Sample ID	5519053432M943- PNEUMO BF 4 SUDESH RANI	Run Date	18 Jun 2019 12:10 PM
Protocol	BAL v3.3	Serial No.	20423803
Pouch Type	Pneumoplus v2.0	Lot No.	464719
Controls	Passed	Operator	HARISH KUMAR (HARISH)
Run Status	Completed	Instrument	2FA01674

Result Summary					
Bacteria					
Bin (copies/mL)	Bin (copies/mL)	Bin (copies/mL)			
		10 <sup>4</sup>	10 <sup>5</sup>	10 <sup>6</sup>	≥10 <sup>7</sup>
Not Detected	<i>Acinetobacter calcoaceticus-baumannii</i> complex				
Not Detected	<i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> complex				
Not Detected	<i>Escherichia coli</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Haemophilus influenzae</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Klebsiella aerogenes</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Klebsiella oxytoca</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i> group				
Not Detected	<i>Moraxella catarrhalis</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Proteus</i> spp.				
Not Detected	<i>Pseudomonas aeruginosa</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Serratia marcescens</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Staphylococcus aureus</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Streptococcus agalactiae</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Streptococcus pneumoniae</i>				
Not Detected	<i>Streptococcus pyogenes</i>				

Antimicrobial Resistance Genes	
⊗ N/A	CTX-M
⊗ N/A	IMP
⊗ N/A	KPC
⊗ N/A	<i>mecA/C</i> and MREJ
⊗ N/A	NDM
⊗ N/A	OXA-48-like
⊗ N/A	VIM

**Note:** Antimicrobial resistance can occur via multiple mechanisms. A Not Detected result for a genetic marker of antimicrobial resistance does not indicate susceptibility to associated antimicrobial drugs or drug classes. A Detected result for a genetic marker of antimicrobial resistance cannot be definitively linked to the microorganism(s) detected. Culture is required to obtain isolates for antimicrobial susceptibility testing and FilmArray Pneumonia Panel *plus* results should be used in conjunction with culture results for the determination of susceptibility or resistance.


  

Atypical Bacteria	
Not Detected	<i>Chlamydia pneumoniae</i>
Detected	<i>Legionella pneumophila</i>
Not Detected	<i>Mycoplasma pneumoniae</i>

Viruses	
Not Detected	Adenovirus
Not Detected	Coronavirus
Not Detected	Human Metapneumovirus
Not Detected	Human Rhinovirus/Enterovirus
Not Detected	Influenza A
Not Detected	Influenza B
Not Detected	Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
Not Detected	Parainfluenza Virus
Not Detected	Respiratory Syncytial Virus

**27 pathogens**  
 15 bacteria: semi quantitative results  
 3 bacteria: Atypical pneumonia  
 9 viruses  
 Resistance genes: MRSA, ESBL, CRE






# SGRH Biofire Pneumonia Panel Data: June– Oct 2019



**N= 55**

**+ve: 33 (59.7%)**

**Organisms: 34 Coinfections: 9**





Thanks